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John E. Horan and Joseph Angelotti, 
                                                    Appellants 
_______________________ 
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for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
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(Honorable Maurice B. Cohill, Jr.) 
______________ 
 
Argued: September 10, 2012 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, ROTH, and BARRY, Circuit Judges. 
2 
 
 
(Filed: August 23, 2013) 
 
Joseph M. Kanfer, Esq. (ARGUED) 
John F. Mizner, Esq. 
Mizner Law Firm 
201 German Street 
Erie, PA  16507 
 Counsel for Appellees 
 
Richard A. Lanzillo, I, Esq. (ARGUED) 
Knox, McLaughlin, Gornall & Sennett  
120 West Tenth Street 
Erie, PA  16501 
 
 Counsel for Appellants 
 
_________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this appeal from a motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ § 
1983 claim, we must determine whether state officials’ 
approval and subsidization of an apartment for the Section 8 
housing program, even though the apartment allegedly failed 
to comply with Section 8’s Housing Quality Standards, 
constitutes a state-created danger toward the apartment’s 
tenant and her guest in violation of their substantive due 
process rights under the United States Constitution.  
 
3 
 
Accepting plaintiffs’ plausible factual allegations as 
true for the purpose of this appeal, we do not find that 
plaintiffs have adequately pled a state-created danger claim. 
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the District 
Court.
1
 
 
I. 
 On July 25, 2010, a fire at an apartment located at 933 
West 18th Street in Erie, Pennsylvania took the lives of tenant 
Tyreesha L. Richardson and her guest Gwyneth E. Henry. 
Their bodies were found on the third floor of the apartment, 
and an autopsy confirmed both women died from smoke 
inhalation. The third-floor bedroom purportedly lacked a 
smoke detector and an alternate means of egress—even 
though the apartment was required to have both safety 
features under the Section 8 housing choice voucher program 
in which Richardson participated.  
 
Plaintiff Alyshia M. Richardson is the administratrix 
of the estate of Tyreesha L. Richardson, and Plaintiff Mario 
Henry is the administrator of the estate of Gwyneth E. Henry.  
 
A. 
Section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 
                                                 
1
 All references to the District Court refer to its memorandum 
order, Henry v. City of Erie, No. 10-260, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 110562 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2011), and to the Report 
and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Baxter, dated 
August 19, 2011, which was adopted as the opinion of the 
District Court. Id. at *5. 
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U.S.C. § 1437f, established a housing program to help 
eligible low-income families afford safe and sanitary housing. 
The United States Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (“HUD”) oversees the program, which is 
administered by local agencies in accordance with federal 
guidelines. In Erie, the local administering agency is the 
Housing Authority of the City of Erie (“HACE”). Defendant 
John E. Horan is the Executive Director of HACE, where he 
is responsible for ensuring HACE complies with applicable 
laws and regulations as well as overseeing its employees. 
Defendant Joseph Angelotti is employed by HACE as a 
Section 8 Housing Inspector.  
 
HACE provides housing vouchers to families it 
determines qualify for tenant-based assistance. A qualifying 
family may take the voucher to a willing landlord of its 
choosing, subject to HACE’s approval of the tenancy. HACE 
approval requires an inspection and a determination that the 
dwelling unit meets the Housing Quality Standards (“HQS”) 
promulgated by HUD. Among other things, the Housing 
Quality Standards require that the dwelling unit have “an 
alternate means of exit in case of fire (such as fire stairs or 
egress through windows),” 24 C.F.R. § 982.401(k), and “at 
least one battery-operated or hard-wired smoke detector, in 
proper operating condition, on each level,” Id. § 982.401(n). 
 
If HACE approves a tenancy after inspection, HACE 
and the property owner will enter into a Housing Assistance 
Payment (“HAP”) contract in which HACE agrees to pay a 
certain portion of the tenant’s monthly rent. The tenant enters 
into a lease with the property owner and is responsible for 
paying the remainder of the agreed-upon rent. The property 
owner must keep the unit in compliance with the Housing 
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Quality Standards for the duration of the lease. HACE 
employs housing inspectors to inspect units prior to leasing, 
annually thereafter, and “at other times as needed” to ensure 
compliance. Id. § 982.405(a). HACE’s Administrative Plan 
provides: 
 
1. The owner must maintain the assisted unit in 
accordance with HQS. 
 
2. The HACE will take prompt action to enforce 
the owner’s obligations for owner breach of the 
HQS. 
 
3. The HACE will notify the owner and tenant 
of HQS deficiencies for which the owner is 
responsible. The notice will provide for the 
following: 
 
 For HQS failures, the owner will be 
given up to thirty (30) days to correct the 
item(s). The HACE Executive Director 
or designee may, at his/her discretion, 
approve a reasonable extension of time 
depending upon the extent or scope of 
work required. 
 
 If the defect is life threatening to the 
family’s health or safety, the owner will 
be given 24 hours to correct the 
violation. 
 
 If the owner fails to correct failed items, 
the payment will be suspended or the 
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HAP Contract will be terminated. 
 
4. The HACE will not make any assistance 
payments for a dwelling unit in which HQS 
deficiencies have not been corrected after the 
notice period has expired. 
 
5. If “life threatening” deficiencies are not 
corrected within 24 hours, the owner will be 
given notice of intent to terminate the HAP 
Contract and that the Housing Assistance 
Payment will be suspended through the 
Termination Notice period. 
 
Compl. ¶ 63 (citing Housing Authority of the City of Erie, 
Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Administrative Plan, 6-3 
to 6-4 (2003)).
2
  
 
B. 
Richardson was a tenant participant in the Section 8 
housing program. With her voucher, Richardson rented a unit 
on the second and third floors of an apartment duplex owned 
by Brett and Patricia Hammel.  
 
According to the complaint, on March 27, 2006, 
                                                 
2
 Similarly, 24 C.F.R. § 982.404(a)(2) requires HACE to 
“take prompt and vigorous action to enforce the owner 
obligations” in response to an owner’s failure to comply with 
the Housing Quality Standards, with remedies including 
“termination, suspension or reduction of housing assistance 
payments and termination of the HAP contract.”  
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Angelotti performed the initial inspection required to approve 
the apartment for the program. He failed the apartment at that 
time and informed the owners the following repairs were 
necessary to make it suitable for the Section 8 program:  
 
In the third floor bedroom: 
a. Install a smoke detector. 
b. Secure the railing.  
c. A fire escape ladder must be in place 
for a second means of egress. 
 
Id. ¶ 68.  
On April 25, 2006, Angelotti purportedly allowed the 
apartment to pass inspection, even though it still lacked a 
third-floor fire escape ladder. We will also assume the 
apartment lacked a third-floor smoke detector, although the 
complaint is inconsistent regarding such allegations.
3
  
 
Angelotti then purportedly allowed the apartment to 
pass annual inspections in 2007, 2009, and 2010. Plaintiffs 
assert Angelotti inspected the apartment on March 24th and 
March 31st of 2009. A HACE Inspection Checklist lists 
various categories for inspection. On the 2009 Checklist, next 
                                                 
3
 At one point in the complaint, plaintiffs state that at the time 
of the fire, “upon information and belief, the third floor 
bedroom failed to have a smoke detector.” Id. ¶ 17. But at 
another point, plaintiffs assert that “[w]hether a smoke 
detector was installed or whether the railing was secured in 
March or April of 2006 is unknown.” Id. ¶ 69. We assume the 
apartment did not have a third-floor smoke detector because it 
does not affect our analysis. 
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to the “smoke detectors” category, an “x” has been marked 
under the column stating “No,” and the words “Install in 
bedroom” have been written in. Id. ¶ 72. In 2010, the 
apartment was inspected once. The 2010 Checklist has the 
same “No” indication next to the “smoke detectors” category, 
along with a handwritten annotation:  
 
Install as need 
replace batteries. 
 
Id. ¶ 74. 
 The results of the 2008 annual inspection are 
unknown, but on April 29, 2008, Kimberly A. Preston, 
HACE’s Section 8 Program Coordinator, sent a letter to 
Richardson stating: 
 
Please be advised that the Housing Authority of 
the City of Erie will terminate all housing 
assistance payments and the Section 8 contract 
on your behalf effective May 31, 2008. 
 
This action will be taken because your housing 
unit was not brought up to the required Housing 
Quality Standards. Please refer to our inspection 
report dated April 29, 2008 (however, if the 
work has been completed, please contact the 
office and schedule a re-inspection). 
 
Id. ¶ 71. Preston sent similar letters to Richardson after the 
2009 and 2010 inspections. The 2009 letter warned that 
housing assistance payments would terminate effective May 
31, 2009 due to the inspection report dated March 31, 2009, 
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unless the apartment was brought into compliance with the 
Housing Quality Standards. The 2010 letter warned that 
housing assistance payments would terminate effective May 
31, 2010 due to the inspection report dated April 8, 2010, 
unless the apartment was brought into compliance with the 
Housing Quality Standards. Despite these warning letters and 
the owners’ continued failure to comply with the Housing 
Quality Standards, HACE did not terminate the housing 
assistance payments for Richardson’s apartment. As noted, on 
July 25, 2010, the apartment succumbed to fire,
4
 and 
Richardson and Henry died in the third-floor bedroom.  
 
C. 
Plaintiffs brought suit on behalf of decedents 
Richardson and Henry, asserting the following: (1) an equal 
protection claim against the City of Erie; (2) a § 1983 claim 
against HACE, Horan, and Angelotti for violating the 
Housing Act; (3) a § 1983 claim against HACE, Horan, and 
Angelotti under the state-created danger theory; and (4) a 
negligence claim against the Hammels, the apartment’s 
owners.  
 
The District Court referred the matter to a Magistrate 
Judge and adopted in toto the Report and Recommendation of 
the Magistrate Judge. The court dismissed plaintiffs’ equal 
protection claim and Housing Act claim. But the court found 
plaintiffs adequately pled a state-created danger claim by 
asserting that but for defendants’ affirmative acts in 
approving and subsidizing the apartment, Richardson would 
not have been living in that apartment, and she and Henry 
                                                 
4
 The complaint does not identify the cause of the fire.  
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would not have been killed in the fire. The court stated 
Richardson’s and Henry’s deaths were a foreseeable result of 
defendants’ acts, and found Richardson and Henry were part 
of a discrete class of persons—occupants of the third-floor 
bedroom—subjected to harm. The court also concluded a jury 
could find defendants’ behavior was deliberately indifferent 
and conscience-shocking.  
 
The court rejected Horan and Angelotti’s qualified 
immunity defense, explaining that because the state-created 
danger doctrine was well-established since July 1999, and 
defendants deliberately disregarded a known violation of 
Section 8, they could not have believed their conduct 
comported with the law. The court found a reasonable official 
would have understood that approving the apartment for the 
Section 8 program despite its noncompliance with the 
Housing Quality Standards would violate decedents’ 
substantive due process rights.  
 
Horan and Angelotti appeal the District Court’s order 
denying them qualified immunity on plaintiffs’ state-created 
danger claim. Meanwhile, plaintiffs’ negligence claim against 
the Hammels and state-created danger claim against HACE 
remain pending in the District Court. 
 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because 
an order denying a public official’s motion to dismiss that is 
based on qualified immunity and turns on a question of law is 
immediately appealable as a “final decision” under the Cohen 
collateral order doctrine. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 672 
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(2009) (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 
U.S. 541 (1949)).  
 
“We exercise de novo review of a district court’s 
denial of a motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds 
as it involves a pure question of law.” James v. City of 
Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 2012). To withstand 
a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on 
its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “While legal 
conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they 
must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. at 679. 
 
III. 
Plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Under 
Section 1983, a plaintiff must plead a deprivation of a 
constitutional right and that the constitutional deprivation was 
caused by a person acting under the color of state law.” 
Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 235 (3d Cir. 
2008). 
 
Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, 
“government officials performing discretionary functions 
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar 
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory 
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 
have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 
(1982). To determine whether defendants are entitled to 
qualified immunity, we must ask “whether ‘the facts alleged 
show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right,’” 
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and “‘whether the right was clearly established.’” Pearson v. 
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 
533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). The Courts of Appeals may 
“exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two 
prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be 
addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular 
case at hand.” Id. at 236. In this case, we find the complaint, 
taken in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, fails to “‘show 
the [officials’] conduct violated a constitutional right.’” 
Walter v. Pike Cnty., 544 F.3d 182, 191 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201). Therefore, plaintiffs’ 
claim should have been dismissed.  
 
IV. 
Federal appellate courts that have addressed the issue 
have held that the Housing Act does not create a private right 
to housing of a particular condition or a private cause of 
action to enforce any such right.
5
 See Banks v. Dallas Hous. 
Auth., 271 F.3d 605, 610-11 (5th Cir. 2001); Perry v. Hous. 
                                                 
5
 Several district courts have also held that an individual may 
not maintain a private cause of action for allegedly unsafe 
housing conditions under Section 8 of the Housing Act. See, 
e.g., Reynolds v. PBG Enters., LLC, Civ. A. No. 10-4373, 
2011 WL 2678589, at *8-9 (E.D. Pa. July 6, 2011) (no 
express federal rights created or private cause of action 
implied under § 1437f); Montgomery v. City of New York, No. 
09 Civ. 6145(RJH), 2010 WL 3563069, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 7, 2010) (same); Kirby v. Richmond Redev. & Hous. 
Auth., No. 3:04cv791, 2005 WL 5864797, at *8 (E.D. Va. 
Sept. 28, 2005) (same), aff’d, 194 F. App’x 105 (4th Cir. 
2006). 
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Auth. of Charleston, 664 F.2d 1210, 1217 (4th Cir. 1981). 
The statute itself is silent on the issue of a private cause of 
action. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f.
 
 But the implementing 
regulations specify that no rights are conferred on tenants to 
sue for violations of the Housing Quality Standards. See 24 
C.F.R. § 982.406 (stating the Housing Choice Voucher 
Program “does not create any right of the family, or any party 
other than HUD or the PHA [Public Housing Agency], to 
require enforcement of the HQS requirements by HUD or the 
PHA, or to assert any claim against HUD or the PHA, for 
damages, injunction or other relief, for alleged failure to 
enforce the HQS”). 
 
In accordance with this case law, plaintiffs do not 
bring suit under § 1983 for violations of Section 8 or its 
accompanying regulations. Rather, plaintiffs contend that 
defendants, acting under color of state law, deprived 
decedents of their “right[s] to life, liberty and bodily integrity 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.” 
Phillips, 515 F.3d at 235. Although the Supreme Court has 
made clear that “a State’s failure to protect an individual 
against private violence simply does not constitute a violation 
of the Due Process Clause,” DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989), we have 
recognized that a state actor may be held liable under the 
“state-created danger” doctrine for creating a danger to an 
individual in certain circumstances. See Morrow v. Balaski, 
No.11-2000, 2013 WL 2466892, at *13 (3d Cir. June 5, 2013) 
(en banc). 
 
The state-created danger doctrine derives from the 
Supreme Court’s decision in DeShaney. In that case, four-
year-old Joshua DeShaney was repeatedly beaten by his 
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father. 489 U.S. at 192-93. Although the Winnebago County 
Department of Social Services (“DSS”) obtained a court order 
to place Joshua in the temporary custody of a local hospital, it 
returned him to his father’s custody after deciding there was 
insufficient evidence of abuse. Id. at 192. DSS continued to 
check on Joshua, but despite signs of abuse, failed to take any 
action to protect him. Id. at 192-93. The beatings from his 
father eventually caused Joshua to suffer severe brain 
damage. Id. at 193.  
 
Joshua and his mother brought suit against DSS and 
several of its employees under § 1983, alleging that by failing 
to protect Joshua against a risk of which they knew or should 
have known, defendants violated Joshua’s rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The Court rejected Joshua’s 
claim, stating, “[a]s a general matter, . . . we conclude that a 
State’s failure to protect an individual against private violence 
simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process 
Clause.” Id. at 197. The Court acknowledged that in limited 
contexts, such as “incarceration, institutionalization, or other 
similar restraint of personal liberty,” a “special relationship” 
between the state and the individual imposes on the state an 
affirmative duty to protect, but found that such a relationship 
did not exist between Joshua and the state because the harm 
to Joshua occurred while he was in his father’s custody. Id. at 
200-03.  
 
Moreover, in finding the state and its employees could 
not be held liable on the facts of the case, the Court explained 
the state had not, by its actions, placed Joshua in a more 
dangerous position: 
 
While the State may have been aware of the 
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dangers that Joshua faced in the free world, it 
played no part in their creation, nor did it do 
anything to render him any more vulnerable to 
them. That the State once took temporary 
custody of Joshua does not alter the analysis, 
for when it returned him to his father’s custody, 
it placed him in no worse position than that in 
which he would have been had it not acted at 
all; the State does not become the permanent 
guarantor of an individual’s safety by having 
once offered him shelter.  
  
Id. at 201. Among several circuits, including our own, this 
language generated a “complement to the DeShaney holding 
[that] has come to be known . . . as the ‘state-created danger 
doctrine.’” Bright v. Westmoreland Cnty., 443 F.3d 276, 281 
(3d Cir. 2006). To establish a state-created danger claim, 
plaintiffs must plead four elements:  
 
(1) the harm ultimately caused was foreseeable 
and fairly direct; 
 
(2) a state actor acted with a degree of 
culpability that shocks the conscience; 
 
(3) a relationship between the state and the 
plaintiff existed such that the plaintiff was a 
foreseeable victim of the defendant’s acts, or a 
member of a discrete class of persons subjected 
to the potential harm brought about by the 
state’s actions, as opposed to a member of the 
public in general; and 
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(4) a state actor affirmatively used his or her 
authority in a way that created a danger to the 
citizen or that rendered the citizen more 
vulnerable to danger than had the state not acted 
at all. 
 
Morrow, 2013 WL 2466892, at *13-14 (quoting Bright, 443 
F.3d at 281). In this case, we needn’t look further than the 
first element of the state-created danger claim. Because the 
harm caused was not a “fairly direct” result of defendants’ 
actions, plaintiffs have not adequately pled a state-created 
danger claim.   
 
The first step of the state-created danger analysis 
requires the harm to be a “foreseeable and fairly direct” 
consequence of defendants’ actions. “To adequately plead 
foreseeability . . . , we require a plaintiff to allege . . . an 
awareness of risk that is sufficiently concrete to put the [state] 
actors on notice of the harm.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 238. We 
think the harm that occurred here was likely foreseeable. By 
establishing basic safety requirements for Section 8 housing, 
the Housing Quality Standards are intended to guard against 
foreseeable hazards. The risk created by housing a tenant in 
an apartment without a third-floor smoke detector or fire 
escape is clear—that, in the event of a fire, persons on the 
third floor might become trapped and harmed thereby. 
Several cases have so held based on claims of negligence.
6
 
                                                 
6
 See, e.g., Fed. Ins. Co. ex rel. Singer v. ADT Sec. Sys., Inc. , 
222 F.R.D. 578, 581 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (“‘[T]he danger of fire is 
foreseeable in virtually any context . . . .’” (quoting Bartelli v. 
O’Brien, 718 N.E.2d 344, 349 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999))); Dillard 
v. Pittway Corp., 719 So. 2d 188, 192 (Ala. 1998) 
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But foreseeability does not end the analysis. Most cases 
involving failure to comply with health and safety standards 
will meet the hurdle of foreseeability. More significant and 
relevant here is the requirement that defendants’ actions be a 
“fairly direct” cause of decedents’ harm.  
 
State actors are not liable every time their actions set 
into motion a chain of events that result in harm. The 
Supreme Court has explained, for instance, that  
 
[a] legislative decision that has an incremental 
impact on the probability that death will result 
in any given situation—such as setting the 
speed limit at 55-miles-per-hour instead of 45—
cannot be characterized as state action depriving 
a person of life just because it may set in motion 
a chain of events that ultimately leads to the 
random death of an innocent bystander. 
 
Martinez v. State of California, 444 U.S. 277, 281 (1980).  
Martinez arose from the murder of a teenage girl by a 
parolee. Id. at 279. The girl’s parents brought suit, contending 
                                                                                                             
(“Certainly, it is foreseeable that a person could be hurt if a 
smoke detector fails to give notice for all to exit the house . . . 
.”); Doyle v. S. Pittsburgh Water Co., 199 A.2d 875, 879 (Pa. 
1964) (“Could the needs of domiciliary life require anything 
more vitally than proper fire protection?”); Thornton v. Phila. 
Hous. Auth., 4 A.3d 1143, 1152 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010) 
(“The purpose of the smoke/fire detection system was to 
provide an early warning of fire and to prevent and reduce 
damages and resulting injuries.”). 
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state officials responsible for releasing the parolee should be 
held liable for the ensuing harm. Id. The parents claimed state 
officials were aware that the parolee had been committed to a 
mental hospital as a sex offender not amenable to treatment 
and imprisoned with the recommendation that he not be 
paroled, but that these officials nonetheless decided to parole 
him five years into his incarceration. Id. The parolee 
committed the murder five months after his release. Id. at 
279-80. The Court assumed that state officials knew or should 
have known that such an incident would occur. Id. at 280. 
Nonetheless, it held that “at least under the particular 
circumstances of this parole decision, appellants’ decedent’s 
death is too remote a consequence of the parole officers’ 
action to hold them responsible under the federal civil rights 
law.” Id. at 285. The Court explained that regardless of 
whether the parole board could be said to have “proximately” 
caused the decedent’s death as a matter of state tort law, the 
parole board did not deprive the decedent of life within the 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The Court 
concluded that “[a]lthough a § 1983 claim has been described 
as ‘a species of tort liability,’ it is perfectly clear that not 
every injury in which a state official has played some part is 
actionable under that statute.” Id. (citation omitted) (quoting 
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976)).  
 
Martinez made clear that even if state officials take 
action with the requisite culpability, the scope of 
consequences for which they may be held liable is 
circumscribed. At some point, regardless of what state tort 
law may provide, the harm that follows from state officials’ 
actions becomes too remote to support liability under § 1983. 
Although Martinez did not lay down a rubric for measuring 
remoteness, we have addressed this issue with some 
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specificity in the state-created danger context.  
 
In Morse v. Lower Merion School District, we found 
plaintiffs failed to adequately plead the “foreseeable and 
fairly direct” element of a state-created danger claim. 132 
F.3d 902, 904 (3d Cir. 1997). School officials in Morse had 
allegedly left the back entrance to the school unlocked, in 
violation of school policy, to allow various contractors to 
come and go easily. Id. Through this unlocked back door, a 
mentally ill person entered the school grounds and shot and 
killed teacher Diane Morse. Id. Morse’s family brought suit 
against the school district, alleging that officials’ actions in 
leaving the back door unlocked deprived Morse of her right 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to be free from physical 
harm. Id. We affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the 
claim. Id. In addition to holding that the murder was 
unforeseeable, we held the attack “was not a ‘fairly direct’ 
result of defendants’ actions.” Id. at 908. We explained, 
 
[w]hile we must accept the allegation that [the 
attacker] gained access to the building through 
the unlocked rear entrance, this does not mean 
the attack on Diane Morse occurred as a direct 
result of defendants allowing the construction 
crews to prop open the door. The causation, if 
any, is too attenuated. 
 
Id. at 909. In short, “it was not defendants’ decision to allow 
the rear entrance to the school to remain open that 
precipitated or was the catalyst for the attack on Ms. Morse. . 
. . [A]s a matter of law, . . . their actions [cannot] be said to 
have directly caused the attack.” Id. at 910.  
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Also instructive on the issue of causation is a case 
considered by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit. See Ruiz v. McDonnell, 299 F.3d 1173 (10th 
Cir. 2002). In Ruiz, a young boy was fatally injured by the 
operator of his daycare facility. Id. at 1178. After the boy’s 
death, his mother brought suit against state licensing officials, 
alleging the officials improperly licensed the daycare facility 
even though they knew or should have known that the 
operator had a history of domestic violence and that the 
facility did not carry proper insurance. Id. Applying a state-
created danger test that requires a plaintiff to allege that “the 
defendants’ conduct put the plaintiff at substantial risk of 
serious, immediate, and proximate harm,” the Tenth Circuit 
held the plaintiff had not adequately pled a state-created 
danger claim. Id. at 1183. The court explained that 
“[a]ffirmative conduct for purposes of § 1983 should 
typically involve conduct that imposes an immediate threat of 
harm, which by its nature has a limited range and duration.” 
Id. The plaintiff’s claim failed because, among other things, 
“improper licensure did not impose an immediate threat of 
harm,” but instead an unactionable “threat of an indefinite 
range and duration.” Id. 
 
Although our articulation of the elements of a state-
created danger claim differs somewhat from that expressed by 
the Tenth Circuit, we concur that improper licensure will 
often be too far removed from the ultimate harm to permit 
liability under § 1983. Our phrasing in Morse supports this 
view. To fulfill the “fairly direct” requirement of the state-
created danger claim, the plaintiff must plausibly allege that 
state officials’ actions “precipitated or w[ere] the catalyst for” 
the harm for which the plaintiff brings suit. Morse, 132 F.3d 
at 910. “Precipitate,” in turn, means “to cause to happen or 
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come to a crisis suddenly, unexpectedly, or too soon.” 
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary  1784 (1993); 
see also The Random House Dictionary of the English 
Language 1521 (2d ed. 1987) (defining “precipitate” as “to 
hasten the occurrence of; bring about prematurely, hastily, or 
suddenly”); id. at 325 (defining “catalyst” as “a person or 
thing that precipitates an event or change”). Thus, it is 
insufficient to plead that state officials’ actions took place 
somewhere along the causal chain that ultimately led to the 
plaintiff’s harm.  
 
Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that defendants’ 
actions were close in time and succession to the ultimate 
harm. In other words, defendants’ approval and subsidization 
of the apartment did not lead “fairly directly” to the fire that 
claimed the lives of Richardson and Henry. Defendants’ 
actions were separated from the ultimate harm by a lengthy 
period of time and intervening forces and actions.  
 
Although the cause of the fire is not known at this 
stage of the litigation, plaintiffs do not allege that defendants 
caused the fire or increased the apartment’s susceptibility to 
fire. Nor do plaintiffs contend that defendants failed to install 
a smoke detector and a fire escape on the third floor of 
Richardson’s apartment. Plaintiffs’ allegations against 
defendants are a step further removed: plaintiffs contend that 
defendants should have compelled or induced the 
landlord/owners to install a fire escape and smoke detector (or 
induced Richardson to live elsewhere), either by not 
approving the apartment for the Section 8 housing program 
and/or by terminating the subsidy payments that allowed 
Richardson to continue to live there.  
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Unfortunately for plaintiffs, their reasoning proves too 
much. Plaintiffs’ complaint makes clear it was the owners’ 
responsibility—not defendants’—to install a smoke detector 
and fire escape. The regulations cited by plaintiffs confirm 
the owner is required to maintain the unit in accordance with 
the Housing Quality Standards. See Compl. ¶ 42 (citing 24 
C.F.R. 982.404(a)). Assuming, as we must, that a smoke 
detector and fire escape could have prevented decedents’ 
deaths, the responsibility (and capability) to install these 
safety features did not rest with defendants.
7
  
 
Further attenuating the connection between 
defendants’ actions and the ultimate harm is the fact that 
Richardson remained in the apartment and received rent 
subsidies despite having actual notice the apartment failed to 
meet the Housing Quality Standards. There was substantial 
time to reflect on the living situation before the fire took 
place. Defendants did not “‘throw[] [her] into a snake pit,’” 
Ye v. United States, 484 F.3d 634, 637 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(quoting Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 
1982)), with all the urgency that such a situation would entail. 
According to the complaint, defendants warned Richardson 
that her apartment was not up to code. And plaintiffs do not 
allege that defendants did anything to hinder her or the 
landlord/owners from bringing it into compliance. As 
unfortunate as the circumstances may be, “[w]hen a victim 
bears some responsibility for the risks she has incurred, it is 
even more difficult to say that the ‘state’ has ‘created’ the 
                                                 
7
 We recognize that plaintiffs have a negligence claim 
pending against the landlord/owners in the District Court. We 
express no opinion on the merits of that action.  
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‘danger’ to her by its affirmative acts.” Jones v. Reynolds, 
438 F.3d 685, 694 (6th Cir. 2006).
8
  
 
Under the circumstances, we cannot find that 
defendants created the danger faced by decedents—there 
were too many links in the causal chain after defendants acted 
and before tragedy struck.  
 
V. 
The Supreme Court has counseled a restrained 
approach in the area of substantive due process. The Court 
has said that “guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in 
this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended,” and 
cautioned that courts must “exercise the utmost care 
whenever . . . asked to break new ground in this field.” 
Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992). 
Heeding this advice, the DeShaney Court declined to expand 
its substantive due process jurisprudence even in the face of 
tragic circumstances, explaining that  
 
[t]he people . . . may well prefer a system 
of liability which would place upon the State 
and its officials the responsibility for failure to 
                                                 
8
 By so holding, we do not mean to minimize the difficult 
situation faced by many participants in the Section 8 housing 
choice voucher program. We recognize that, practically 
speaking, Section 8 participants may face limited options for 
obtaining safe and sanitary housing. We merely emphasize 
that these limitations derive from the housing market and the 
participants’ financial circumstances—not from the state’s 
implementation of the housing voucher program.  
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act in situations such as the present one. They 
may create such a system, if they do not have it 
already, by changing the tort law of the State in 
accordance with the regular lawmaking process. 
But they should not have it thrust upon them by 
this Court’s expansion of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
489 U.S. at 203. Again, in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, the 
Court said that substantive due process “does not entail a 
body of constitutional law imposing liability whenever 
someone cloaked with state authority causes harm,” 523 U.S. 
833, 848 (1998), and found that in cases dealing with 
executive action, our role is to guard against “only the most 
egregious official conduct,” id. at 846.  
 
Under our state-created danger jurisprudence, we 
cannot find that defendants’ failings amount to a state-created 
danger. We decline to expand the state-created danger 
doctrine—a narrow exception to the general rule that the state 
has no duty to protect its citizens from private harms—to 
embrace this case.
9
 Accordingly, we will reverse the order of 
the District Court denying qualified immunity to Horan and 
Angelotti and remand for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
                                                 
9
 We are not aware of a case in which a circuit court extended 
liability under the state-created danger doctrine to licensing-
type activities. Nor have plaintiffs cited such a case. 
